THE DAIRY POLICY OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY by Cioffi, Antonio
Staff Papers Series
P86-20  June 1986
THE DAIRY POLICY OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
Antonio Cioffi
Department  of Agricultural and Applied Economics
University  of Minnesota
Institute  of Agriculture,  Forestry  and Home Economics
St. Paul, Minnesota 55108THE DAIRY POLICY OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
Antonio Cioffi *
*Ricercatore,  Dipartimento di Economia e Politica Agraria, visiting
Department of Agricultural and Applied Economics,  University of Minnesota.
The author thanks  Jerry Hammond, Guenther Schmitt and Harald von Witzke
for comments and suggestions.
Staff Papers  are published without  formal review within the
Department of Agricultural and Applied Economics
The Univeristy  of Minnesota is  committed to  the policy that  all
persons shall have equal access to  its programs,  facilities,  and
employment without  regard to  race, religion, color, sex, national
origin, handicap,  age, or veteran status.The  Dairy Policy of  the  European  Community
by  Antonio  Cioffi
1.  Introduction
Milk  is  by  far  the  most  important agricultural  good  in  the  European
Community  (EC).  In  1983  the  value  of  the milk  production in  the  EC was
about  33  billion of dollars with  a share of  the  final  agricultural
production  that  accounted  for  the  25  percent.
An analysis  of  the  regulation of  the  dairy  industry and  of  its
modifications  over  time  represent an  interesting example  on  how the  EC
policy makers  behave.  It  provides  insights  into  the  goals  of  the  Common
Agricultural Policy  (CAP),  on how  they have  been pursued  since  the
foundation of  the  EC and  on what effects  have been generated by  its
implementation.  It  also  reflects  the  nature of  the  problems  created by  the
quite particular system of  relationships between the  institutions  involved
in  the  CAP decision making process  and  the  directions  that  this  process  has
taken  in  the  time  responding  to  the  changes  of  the  economic  environment on
which  it  relates.
In  the  following pages,  I will  describe  the  regulation of  the  EC dairy
industry  as  it  was  designed  at  the beginning  of  the  period of  full  implemen-
tation of  the  CAP and  its  major effects  on  production and  consumption.  Next,
I will describe  the modifications  of  the  dairy  program that  were introduced
as  a response  to  the  problems  generated  by  the  support granted  to  the
industry until  the  introduction of  the  quota  system in  1984.-2-
2.  The Regulation of  the EC Dairy  Industry
The  EC price and market policies  on  the dairy market  are  provided by
Regulation 804/1968.  The  system is  based  on  the  yearly  fixing  of a target
price  for milk with a fat  content  of  3.7  percent.  The  target  price  is  not
the price  that  the  EC milk producers  necessarily receive during the  market
year.  It  is  the  target  price  level  that  they  should  receive,  on average,
given  the  instruments  to  support  the  market.  In  order  to  achieve  this
price,  a  set of intervention  prices  and  threshold  prices  for  some dairy
products  is  fixed.
Intervention  prices  are  fixed  for  butter, skimmed milk  powder and  for
Grana-Padano and  Parmigiano-Reggiano cheeses  produced  in  some  regions  of  the
EC-.  At  these  prices  the intervention agencies  of each Member State are
allowed  to  buy  the  quantities offered by  the  dairies.
In  order  to  insulate  the  EC dairy market  from the world market,
variable  levies and  export  refunds  are  provided  for  trade with  third  non-
member countries.  The  variable  levy  charged on a  product  imported  in  the
EC  is  the  difference between  its  threshold price  (minimum import  price)  and
its  lowest  import  c.i.f. price.  To  cover  the wide number of dairy products,
threshold  prices  are  fixed  for  "pilot  products",  of which each  one  is
representative of a group of homogeneous products  called  "assimilated
products".  The variable  levy  is  determined  for  each  "pilote  product"  and
extended  to  the  group  of  "assimilated products".  The  variable  levies  are
determined by  the  Commission every  15  days.
Export  refunds  are  subsidies  for  the  exportation  of dairy  products  to
non-member  countries.  They cover  all  dairy  products and  the  amount  is  the
difference between the  prevailing prices  on  the world market and  those  on-3-
the  EC market.  However, the  amount  of export refund  for  a product  is
allowed  to  change  with  the  country of destination.  The export  refunds  are
fixed periodically.  The  Commission  is  authorized to  change  the  refunds
either at  its  own discretion or  on request  by a member state.
The  regulation for  the  EC dairy  industry  also provides  subsidization
for  the  private  storage  of  the  intervention  products  and  for  other cheeses.
Grants are  also  provided  for  skimmed mild and  skimmed  milk powder used as
animal  feed  and  for skimmed milk used  in  the  production of casein.
Within  the  frame of  the  regulation 804/68,  the  EC dairy industry  is
insulated  from the world market.  At  the  same time,  withdrawals from the market
of surpluses  of butter  and  skimmed milk  powder have guaranteed a minimum
price  level  for  the  milk sold  to  the dairies.  According to  Harris  et  al.
(1983),  the  intervention milk price  equivalent was  94.6  percent of  the
target  price  for  1981/82.  Even in  situations  of heavy surplus  of supply
over demand  support  prices  have been  very close  to  the  target  prices.
The  subsidization  for  private  storage  of dairy  products  is  aimed  at
increasing  the  demand of  these  products  when  the  seasonal  cycle  of milk
supply  is  at  the  highest  levels,  avoiding costly withdrawals  from  the
market.  They are  provided  in  the  period  between April  1 and  September  15  of
the  marketing years.  The  subsidization of  fluid  skimmed  milk  to  be  used as
animal  feed  is  set  to make  this  product competitive with other protein  feeds
that  are  imported  from non-member countries  at very  low duties and  to  reduce
production of skimmed milk  powder which must be  withdrawn from  the  market by
the  EC  intervention agencies.
All  decisions concerning  target  price  for milk,  intervention prices,
threshold  prices,  and  subsidies  for dairy product  storage  are made  by  the-4-
Council of  the Ministers  of Agriculture  on proposal  by  the  Commission.  In
this  way  the  Commission, which  is  the  administrative  institution of  the
EC, has  only  the  responsibility  to  propose measures  for  the  implementation
of  the  CAP in  the  dairy  industry  but  the  ultimate decision has  to  be made by
the  Council  of Ministers  which  is  the  political  institution of  the  EC.
However  the  Council has  delegated  the  Commission for  decisions on matters
concerning the management  of  the  dairy market  program.  The decision process
on  the  dairy market policies has  two  stages.  First,  the  Council has  to  take
decision on  the  support  levels  guaranteed  to  the  EC milk producers.  Second,
the  Commission has  the  responsibility  to minimize  the budget  expenditure
given the  support  levels.
3.  The Effects  of  the  Intervention  in  the  Dairy Industry
The  dairy  support program, as  it  was  designed with  the  regulation
804/68,  results  in  the  fact  that  the  price  at  the  farm  "gate"  is  very  close
to  the  annual  fixed  target  price.  It  also  provides  instruments  to  insulate
the  EC  dairy  industry  from  the  world market  and  to  prevent  most  fluctuations
of  the  domestic price.  In  spite  of  its  complexity an example  can give
insights  on  the  problem of  such regulation both  on  the  internal  and  external
markets.  The  following  example  can be  refered  to  one  product subject  to
withdrawal  from  the market  as butter  or  skimmed milk  powder.  In  figure  1
the domestic demand and  supply  for  the  EC are  DEC and SEC, while  the  export
demand  and  supply  for  all countries  but  the  EC are DA and  SA. Adding  to  DA
and SA the  export  demand  and  supply  for  the  EC we  can obtain  the world
export demand  and  supply  DW and SW. In  a situation  of  free  trade  the  world
price  is  PW and  the  quantity  traded  is  OH of which HG  is  exported by  the  EC.-5-
Figure  1
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Now,  let  us  suppose  that  the  EC  decision  makers  fix  an  intervention
price  PI  for  the  commodity  above  PW  and  that  they  will  pay  an  export
refund  in  order  to  sell  the  excess  supply on the world market, while a
variable  levy  equal  to  the difference between the  threshold  price  (minimum
import  price)  and  the world price is introduced  to  protect  the EC domestic
market.  As  a consequence  the  export supply  for  the  EC will  be  perfectly
inelastic  to  the world price and  the  new world export supply will be SW,
while  the  new world export demand will be  DW equivalent  to  DA.  If  the  trade
partners  of the  EC do not retaliate,  the world  price will  decrease at P  W'
while  the  quantity  traded will  increase at OH  of which H G  is exported by
the EC  that will have a larger  share  of  the world market.  The EC budget
11  1 cost  for  the  support  of  the  price at  P1 will be A B  multiplied by PI-PW.
The  implementation of  such  policy has  a number of implications.  The  EC
tax-payers  and consumers  and  the  other countries'  producers  suffer  a loss
while the  EC producers  and  the other  countries'  consumers  are made  better
off.  It  also has a negative  impact on  the balances  of trade  of  the  other
countries  that  have a decrease of  the  revenues  coming from  the  external-6-
trade because both  the  quantities  exported and  their  price decrease.
Furthermore  the  slopes  of  the  world  export supply  and demand  functions  are
reduced with a negative  impact on  the world price  stability.
The  EC regulation is not  "per  se"  the  cause  of  the  burdensome surpluses
of dairy  products  in  the EC and  the  heavy  involvement of  the  EC  budget  in
the  support  of  the market.  The  problems  occured because  in  1968  at  the
beginning  of  the  Common Market  the  Council  of Ministers,  under  the  strong
pressure  of  the  farm unions,  chose a high price support  level  for  the  milk
producers,  even  though  the  Commission was  very concerned  about  the negative
effects  of  such a decision.
The  relatively high  level  of  price  support  granted at  the beginning of
the  Common Market was  not  the  only  factor  that  generated the  heavy surpluses
situation  in  the  EC.  The  criteria used  to  fix  the  support  levels  and  the
changes  that  affected  the  agricultural  system in  the  EC were  the  other
causes  of  this  situation.
The  EC policy makers used  the  price policy as  the  principal,  if not  the
only,  instrument  to  increase  agricultural  incomes  in  the  Community.  The
annual  fixing of  the  agricultural  prices  in  the  EC was  based  on  the
"objective method"  that  the  Commission  for a long time  followed  to  determine
its  proposal  for  the  price revision to  the  Council of Ministers.  According
to  the  "objective method",  the  Commission proposed  support  price  changes
such  to  allow  the  incomes  of  "modern farms"  to be  at  a comparable  level with
non-farm incomes  in  the  EC, after  considering  the  changes  that  took place in
the  productivity  of agricultural  resources  and  in  the  production costs.  On
the  proposal  by  the  Commission,  the  Council  of Ministries usually  granted a
higher variation of  the  level of  price support  as  a result  of  the  complex-7-
bargaining  process  typical  of  the "Bruxell  Marathon" as  the  meetings  for  the
2/ yearly agricultural  prices  revision are  called  in  the  EC-.
The monetary system  in  the  EC also added  additional increases  in  the
agricultural  support  prices  as  expressed  in  the  national  currencies.  This
was  caused  by  the  tendency of  the  countries with relatively stronger  curren-
cies  to  introduce  the  use of  positive Monetary  Compensatory Amounts  (MCA)
instead  of evaluating their  "green money", without diminishing  the  prices  to
3/ their producers.-  While some  countries with weaker  currencies  followed  the
tendency  to  avoid  the  formation of negatitive MCAs devaluating  their  "green
money" and  increasing  the  agricultural  prices  expressed  in national curren-
cies  (von Witzke,  1985).
Generally,  the  price policy  of  the  EC  has  not been able  to  avoid  the
exit.from  the  industry  of  the  marginal  producers.  Rather  it  assured  the
dairy  farms  of bigger  size  the opportunity to  expand  their operational
dimension and  to  introduce new and  improved  technologies.  Thus  in  the  EC as
in  the  US  the  number of dairy  cows  remained  constant,  the number  of dairy
holdings  declined, while  their size  increased considerable.  The
concentration of  the  dairy  production in  larger and more  efficient holdings
and  the  introduction  of new  technologies  in  the  industry generated  very
large increases  in  the  productivity per  cow and  in milk supply.
The  domestic consumption  of milk and dairy  products  increased but  less
than the  supply  increases.  The  consumption of  cheeses  in  the  EC increased
from  10  kilograms  per-capita in  1973  to  13  kg  in  1982 and  that  of  fluid milk
increased  from  101  kg  to  106  kg  in  the  same  period.  The  per-capita consump-
tion of butter  was  apparently constant, but  considering only  the  product  not
consumed under  special measures of  incentive  it  has  declined.  The decrease-8-
of the  butter  consumption was  the  result  of  its  higher  price relative  to
other  fats  and  vegetable oils.  Other  price policies  in  the  EC  allowed  the
entrance  in  the  EC of oilseeds with a low  tariff or  supported  the  farm price
level  in the domestic market with deficiency  payments  schemes  (olives and
oilseeds).  In  order  to  make  the  price ratio on butter  to  other  fats  and
vegetable  oils more  favorable  to  the  butter and  to  increase  its  domestic
consumption  the  Commission made  several  proposals  to  tax  the consumption of
the  other  fats.  To date  these  proposals have never been accepted.
4.  Modifications  in  the  Regulation
The regulation and  support granted  to  the EC dairy industry has been
widely  criticized.  It is charged with generating  production of milk and
dairy  products only  to  be  sold  to  the  intervention agencies,  creating
misallocation of resources,  disrupting  the world  dairy market and being  very
costly  for  the  European Agricultural  Guidence and  Guarantee  Fund  (EAAGGF).
The  interventions  on  the  dairy market are  very expensive  for  the  EC budget.
While  in  1973  the  support  of  the  dairy  industry absorbed about  1.5  billions
of  Units  of  Account  (UA),  equivalent  to  39.2 percent  of  the  EAGGF Guarantee
Section  (Table 1) in  1978  it absorbed  4 billions  of UA  (46 percent of  the
EAGGF Guarantee  Section)  and  in  1984,  5.8  billions of  ECU  (31  percent).-4
Various  attempts  have  been made  by  the  Commission  to  induce  the  Council
of Ministries  to  introduce measures  to  control  the  expansion of  the milk
production and  to  lower  the  expenditure  of  the  EAGGF - Guarantee  Section.
These attempts have produced  very  poor  results, because  the  Council of
Ministers  has  been more  concerned  about  the  incomes of  the dairy  farmers  in
their  home  countries.  Only in  the  1984,  when  the  budget constraint  became-9-
so  critical,  a major  reform was  approved,  introducing a system of national
quotas.
Before the  introduction of  the  quota  system, several modifications were
made on  the  regulation 804/68.  Some  measures were undertaken  to  increase
the domestic demand  for butter  through price  discrimination schemes.  They  try
to  upward  the  demand  for  this  product  in  some  particular periods  (the  so-
called  Christmas-butter)  and  to  subsidize  its  comsumption  by  some  social
groups.
There were also measures  to  subsidize  the  domestic demand  for  dairy
products  not  subject  to withdrawal  from the market  thus  avoiding price  sup-
port acquisition of surpluses  of butter  and  skimmed milk  powder.  This  group
included  regulations  granting subsidies  for whole  liquid milk and whole milk
powder used as  animal  feed,  and  for  the  consumption of milk  and dairy pro-
ducts  of  the  school-children.
These attempts  to  control  the  growth of  the  expenditure yield  little or
no-results.  Under  the  pressure of  the  Commission, several measures were
taken  to  avoid  further  increases  of milk supply.  The  introduction of  the
co-responsibility  levy  was  one measure.  It was  established as  a transitory
measure on  September  1977,  to  be  imposed  until  the  end of  the milk marketing
year  1978/79.  It has become  an  integral  part of  the EC dairy  regime.  The
levy  is charged  on  all  the milk  producers  except  those  in  hill and  mountain
areas.  It  is fixed between  the  1.5  percent and  six percent  of  the  target
price  of milk and  the  revenues arising  from  the  levy are  to  be  used  to
finance  programs  aiming  to  the  stabilization and  expansion of  the  dairy
market.-10-
Even  though  on  the  supply  side  the  co-responsiblity  levy  is  equivalent
to  a reduction of  the  support  price  level,  it  has  not had  effects  on  the
demand  for  dairy  products.  In  the  budget of  the  EAGGF - Guarantee Section,
the co-responsibility  levy  is  recorded as  a revenue  (or  a negative
expenditure).  Some  of  the  levies  supported measures  for  the  expansion of
milk and  dairy  product  consumption  that  in  1984 accounted  for  239  millions
of ECU.  It  is  not  clear what  is  the  impact  that  this measure had  on  the
market and  if  it  has been  really effective  in  the  aim to  expand  the
consumption of dairy  products.  Furthermore,  it  is  possible  that  an
equivalent reduction in  price  support  instead of  the  co-responsibility  levy
would have proven more  effective  in  the  reduction of  the  market  surpluses.
At  the  same  time  that  the  co-responsibility  levy was  introduced,  the
Council  of Ministries approved  another measure  to  reduce  milk supply.  It
introduced a  system of premiums  for  the  non-marketing of milk and  for  the
conversion of dairy herds./  The  premiums were granted  to  producers  that  in
the  1976 had  delivered at  least  50,000 kg of milk  or with at  least  15  cows.
To  receive  the  premiums,  the  producers had  to  agree not  to  market milk  for  a
period  of at  least  five  years or  to  convert  their dairy herds  to  beef.  At
the  same  time  subsidies  for  the  purchase  of  dairy  cows under  the  programs
provided according  to  the  EC - Directive  72/159  (granting  subsidies  for  the
modernization of  farming  in  the  EC) were also  proibited.
The  actions  taken  in  1977 were  not able  to  generate a steady reduction
of milk  supply or  to  control  the  expenditure  for  the dairy  market  support.
By  the  end  of  1983  the  stocks  of butter  and  skimmed milk powder  were  at
record  levels.  Even higher  levels  were  forecast  for  1984.  At  the  same  time
the  funding  restrictions  for  all  the  EC programs  became so  strong  that  the-11-
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EC was  in  danger  of not making budgetal  payments  for  the  fiscal year  1984.6/
With  this  situation a decision  to  cut expenditure  or  to  stop  its  growth had
to  be made and  to  be effective  something should be  done  to  the  dairy  program
because it  was  the  most important  EC budget  item.
At  the  beginning of  the  1980s  the  Commission made several  attempts  to
apply a super-levy to  milk deliveries exceeding specified  levels.  The
objective was  to  avoid  increases  of milk  production exceeding  those  of  the
domestic consumption.  Thus  the  growth  of  surpluses of dairy  products  could
be stopped,  freezing  the  expenditure  for  the  support  of  the  market.  The
Council,  in  1982, agreed  to  adopt a production limit  given by  the  quantity
of milk delivered  in  1981  plus 0.5  percent, which  represented  the average
increase of  the  consumption  of dairy  product  in  the  EC.  But  the  Council
adopted  the  production  limit without enforcing instruments deciding  to  take
measures  later  if  the  limit was  exceeded.  So,  confronting an  increase of
milk production well above  the  limit  in  1983  the  Council  agreed  to  cut  the
increase of  the  target  price  of milk by  the  three percent  from the  average
increase  of  the  common prices  for  the marketing year  1983/84.  It also  fixed
for  1983  as  a guarantee  threshold,  the  production delivered  in  1981  plus  one
percent.
Even  in  1983  the  quantity of milk delivered  to  dairies exceeded  this
limit  and  the  stocks  of  dairy  products  increased drammatically.  Measures  to
keep  under control  the  dairy  industry  could  no more be delayed.  The  EC
decision makers were confronted with  two  choices:  a sharp  reduction of  the
support  prices  (to  be  effective  the  Commission  estimated a cut  of  12
percent)  or  a guarantee  threshold  and  the  provision  of instruments  to  make
it  really  effective.-13-
After  long  discussions,  the  Council  of  the  Ministers  on March  31,  1984
approved  the  introduction of a guarantee threshold based  on  a system of
national quotas  for  the  production of milk.  The  quantity of milk  to  be
allowed  to  price  support  in  the  EC was  set  to  98.2 million tons  for  the
first year,  equal  to  the  quantity of milk delivered  to  dairies  in  1981  plus
one  percent  for  all countries  but  Ireland and  Italy where  the  quota was
7/ fixed according  to  the  deliveries  in  1983  (Table 2).-  For  the  successive
years,  the guarantee  threshold  in  the EC was  set  to  97.2 million  tons.  In
this  way the  deliveries  of milk should  decrease by  5.3  percent  in  1984,  with
respect  to  the  previous year  and by  5.9  percent  in  1985.  For  milk and milk
products  sold directly by  producers  to  consumers,  the  quota was  fixed
according  the  quantities  sold  in  1981  plus  one percent  for  all  countries.
To enforce  the  guarantee  thresholds  and  the  system of national quotas
the production exceeding  the  quota  in each  country is charged a super-levy
of:
- 75  percent  of  the  target  price  of milk, where  formula A is applied
or  there  are direct  sales  to  consumption;
- 100  percent  of  the  target  price  of milk, where  formula  B is applied.
Under  formula  A the  super-levy charged  to  milk producers,  while  Formula B
charges  to  dairies.  The  revenues  coming  from the  super-levy, as  those
arising  from the  co-responsibility  levy,  are  allocated to  finance  the
expenditure  for  the  dairy  program.
The  Council  also  introduced  a "Community  reserve," allocation which
increased  the  guarantee  threshold in  those member states  where  the  implemen-
tation of the  quota system would significantly  affectthe production  struc-
tures.  For  the  milk marketing year  1984/85,  the  "Community reserve" was  set-14-
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at  335,000  tons.  Successively the  Commission decided  to  allocate the
reserve  in  Ireland  (245,000  t.),  North-Ireland  region of  the  UK  (65,000  t.)
and Luxembourg  (25,000  t.).
With the  introduction of the  quota system  the  Council  fixed  for  the
1984/85  the  target  price  for milk at  the  same  level  of 1983/84.- / The  co-
responsibility  levy  for  1984/85 was  set  at  three percent  of  the  target  milk
price,  up from  the  two  percent  for  the  previous  year.
The  regulation introducing  the  quota  system also allowed  the EC  member
states  to  provide  grants  to  compensate milk producers who agree  to  per-
manently exit  from the  dairy  industry.  Each member state has  the  authority
and  the  financial  responsibility  to  promote  and  implement measures  intended
to reduce  the  productive  capacity of  its  milk  industry  to  a  level  consistent
with  the  fixed  quota and  to  reallocate these  reductions  among their  produ-
cers  according  to national  criteria.
The  introduction of  the  quotas  in  the  EC dairy program and associated
activities are  significant measures  for  reducing EC price  support  costs.
Production of milk  in  the  EC  is  not  likely  to  exceed  the  quotas  because  of
the  high  super-levy imposed on  the production of milk exceeding  the
established quota.  The  lower milk production and  some expansion of  the
domestic  consumption generated by  the  lowering  of real  prices  should have
the  effect  of  reducing  the  surpluses  of butter  and  skimmed milk powder.
However,  the  EC will continue  to  have  the  problem of  dairy products  suplu-
ses,  because  the  production, even  though  lower  than  before, will exceed  the
domestic consumption  for  the  foreseeable  future.  In  the  short  term the  EC
budget  expenditure  for  the  support  of  the market  will  be  very  large because-16-
the  problems  of handling and  disposal of  huge  stocks  of  dairy products
accumulated  in  the  years before  the  introduction  of  the  quota system.  But
in  the  long  term  the new measures  should  reduce  the expenditure  for  the
dairy market.
5.  Final  Remarks
The  paper described  the major modifications  in  the  EC dairy  policy
since  its  inception.  For  the most part,  the  program and  program  changes
have  failed  to  rationalize  the  structure of  the  dairy  industry.  The major
objective was  to  lower  the  EAGGF expenditure  for  the  support  of  the market.
Even  the  recent  introduction  of  the  system of national quotas  has  not
corrected  the  problems  of  the  support  and  stabilization of  prices  in  the
dairy market.  It  may slow  or  stop the  continuous  growth  of public  expen-
diture  for  dairy  programs.
Certainly, these  kind of  results  depend  on  the  particular policy making
process  in  the EC.  As  for  every decision the  unanimity  of  the  votes  of
each member state  is necessary, it happens  that  all  political  decisions  are
the  result  of  a complex bargaining  process  involving  the defense  of  the
national  interests  in  the  EC.  The quota  system  is a good example  of
compromise between  national  interests and  the  need  to  lower  the budget
expenditure.-17-
Notes
- The  support granted  to  these  two  cheeses was  established  to  consider
the differences existing  in  the  Italian market where  they are  produced.  The
market of  the  Parmigiano-Reggiano and Grana-Padano  cheeses  has  a very
important function  in  the  formation of  the  prices  of milk and  dairy products
in  Italy  (Perone-Pacifico  et  al.,  1986).  Since  the  interventions  for  the
price  support  of  these  two  cheeses  has  been quite  negligible,  in  the
following I will  refer only  to  those  of butter  and  skimmed milk powder.
2/ /  The criteria  that  the  Commission has  to  follow  in  the determination
of its  proposal of  price  variation to  the  Council  of  Ministries are  not  well
defined.  For  long  time  "the  objective  method" was  the most  important
variable  that  the  Commission  took  in  account.  Later,  as  a consequence  of
the continuous  growth  of  the budget  expenditure  for  the  support  of agri-
cultural  prices,  considerations  on  the  effect  of  price decisions  on  the
domestic and  international markets  become more  important.  For  more infor-
mation on  the  "objective  method"  see  (de  Veer,  1979;  Swinbank, 1979).
3/The common agricultural  prices  in  the  EC are  fixed  in  ECU (European
Currency Units)  and  converted  into  the  national  currencies according to
"green exchange  rates."  As  a member  state devaluates  (evaluates) its
currency with  respect  to  the  ECU,  the  "green  exchange rate"  does  not  change
automatically.  The  difference between  the  two  rates  is  covered by  negative
(positive)  MCAs  that  correspond  to  tariffs  (subsidies) charged  on  the  intra-
community  trade  of agricultural  products.  The  Council  of Ministers  can
devaluate  (evaluate)  the  "green exchange  rate"  of a member state eliminating
the  MCAs.  This  has  the  effect  of increasing  (decreasing) the  support  price-18-
levels  in  the  country.  In  this way  the  "green exchange rates"  enter  into
the bargaining process  of  decision of  the  EC.  For more details  on  the mone-
tary system in  the  EC  see Fennell  (1979),  Harris  et  al.  (1982).
4/Considering  that  the  expenditure  of  the  EAGGF - Guarantee  Section is
on average  2/3 of  the whole  EC budget  it  is  quite  clear  the  dramatic
involvement  of  the  EC  in  the  milk price  support system.
-Member  states,  like  Italy,  in which the  number  of dairy  cows  had  been
reduced by more  than  20  percent  in  the  period  1969-1975  included were
allowed  to  not  implement  this  regulation.
/ The  Treaty of  Rome states  that  the EC budget must  be  in balance.  It
means  that  the  EC cannot  finance  its  deficit borrowing or  imposing  taxes and
the  only  instrument  to  confront  such  situations  is  to  delay payments.
- For  Ireland  the  quota was  fixed at  the  1983 production  level,  plus  a
further quantity  from  the  "community  reserve",  to  consider that milk  produc-
tion  contributes  for  9 percent  of  the G.N.P.  For  Italy  reference was  made
to  1983  because  the  1981 milk production was  the  lowest  in  10  years.
8/
- Even  if  the  target  price  of milk  for  the marketing year  1984/85 was
fixed  at  the  same  level  of  the  previous  year,  considering  the  adjustment of
the "green money"  following  the  elimination of  M.C.A.s,  the  target  price
increased by  2.9  percent, on  average,  as  expressed  in  national currencies.-19-
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